1993 - Sherbro

On the evening of December 8, 1993, the SCAC Delmas Vieljeux container ship Sherbro (grt 30,750 tons) of French flag, having sailed from Le Havre, was underway from Cherbourg to Brest, with a cargo of containers destined for Lagos, Nigeria. The ship's cargo consisted of 1,191 containers (i.e. 19,753 tonnes) distributed between the holds and on deck and 95 vehicles (i.e. 98 tonnes) loaded in the hold. The cargo had been loaded successfully in the ports of Rotterdam (2 December), Felixstowe (4 December), Antwerp (6 December) and Le Havre (7 December). The weather conditions were bad with wind speeds of 80km/hour. Twice within a minute, the vessel listed to 30 degrees. The enormous centrifugal force occurring during this rapid roll caused containers to be lost overboard. The captain of the vessel reported by telex to the nearest French coastal radio station that an estimated sixty containers had been lost and that about one hundred others were damaged. It was later found that a total of 88 containers had been lost.

The violent storm and poor night visibility made it impossible to carry out an exact assessment of the damage: it appeared from the bridge that some containers were lying on their sides from port to starboard. At the same time, numerous ship alarms started, which indicated problems with the local forward propeller and a defect to rudder engine. Two cables coiled on the deck ran out into the sea, which risked getting caught in the propeller. Over an hour's effort on the part of two crew members was necessary to bring the cables back onboard.

Of the 88 containers which had been lost, 10 contained substances classified under the IMDG Code to present a danger to the vessel and crew and/or the marine environment.

Four of the containers loaded with hazardous substances were each carrying 1.8 tons of the pesticide APRON PLUS 50 DS (Class 6.1). The other 6 containers were loaded with:

- 23 tons of nitro-cellulose (a flammable solid, Class 1.1);
- 11 tons of sulphur (a flammable solid, Class 4.1);
- 13 tons of hazardous liquids including turpentine(Class 3.3), dichloroethylene (Class 3.2) and aromatic liquids, all flammable and hazardous to the marine environment.

One of the other 78 containers was filled with the pesticide RIDOMIL plus 72 WP. The pesticide is not classified under the IMDG Code.

On arrival in Brest, the first port of call after the incident, an inspection was carried out by the relevant French Port State Control Authorities. After the necessary repairs, the vessel was found to be seaworthy and allowed to leave the port and proceed with her voyage.

On the evening of December 8, 1993, the SCAC Delmas Vieljeux container ship Sherbro (grt 30,750 tons) of French flag, having sailed from Le Havre, was underway from Cherbourg to Brest, with a cargo of containers destined for Lagos, Nigeria. The ship's cargo consisted of 1,191 containers (i.e. 19,753 tonnes) distributed between the holds and on deck and 95 vehicles (i.e. 98 tonnes) loaded in the hold. The cargo had been loaded successfully in the ports of Rotterdam (2 December), Felixstowe (4 December), Antwerp (6 December) and Le Havre (7 December). The weather conditions were bad with wind speeds of 80km/hour. Twice within a minute, the vessel listed to 30 degrees. The enormous centrifugal force occurring during this rapid roll caused containers to be lost overboard. The captain of the vessel reported by telex to the nearest French coastal radio station that an estimated sixty containers had been lost and that about one hundred others were damaged. It was later found that a total of 88 containers had been lost.

The violent storm and poor night visibility made it impossible to carry out an exact assessment of the damage: it appeared from the bridge that some containers were lying on their sides from port to starboard. At the same time, numerous ship alarms started, which indicated problems with the local forward propeller and a defect to rudder engine. Two cables coiled on the deck ran out into the sea, which risked getting caught in the propeller. Over an hour's effort on the part of two crew members was necessary to bring the cables back onboard.

Of the 88 containers which had been lost, 10 contained substances classified under the IMDG Code to present a danger to the vessel and crew and/or the marine environment.

Four of the containers loaded with hazardous substances were each carrying 1.8 tons of the pesticide APRON PLUS 50 DS (Class 6.1). The other 6 containers were loaded with:

- 23 tons of nitro-cellulose (a flammable solid, Class 1.1);
- 11 tons of sulphur (a flammable solid, Class 4.1);
- 13 tons of hazardous liquids including turpentine(Class 3.3), dichloroethylene (Class 3.2) and aromatic liquids, all flammable and hazardous to the marine environment.

One of the other 78 containers was filled with the pesticide RIDOMIL plus 72 WP. The pesticide is not classified under the IMDG Code.

On arrival in Brest, the first port of call after the incident, an inspection was carried out by the relevant French Port State Control Authorities. After the necessary repairs, the vessel was found to be seaworthy and allowed to leave the port and proceed with her voyage.

On December 11, in accordance with the obligation of the Bonn Agreement to notify, the North Sea coastal States were informed, using the established procedure, of the loss of 88 containers from the Sherbro.

France deployed vessels and aircraft to search for the lost containers. Seven containers were discovered at sea near Cherbourg on December 11. Five of these, all containing harmless substances, were recovered. Attempts to localize via air surveillance met with no success.

Between December 20 and 22, the contents of two containers carrying bags of APRON washed ashore on the French coast near Boulonge. The contents of the third container carrying bags of APRON washed ashore on December 28, south of Boulonge. The bags were removed by the French authorities. Immediately after these events, bags of RIDOMIL washed ashore. By far the greater part of the RIDOMIL cargo was recovered from the beaches of Boulonge.

The missing fourth container loaded with APRON was sighted, by the French navy, floating on January 3, 1994 at a distance of 4.3 nautical miles north-west of Cap Gris Nez (near Calais). Due to bad weather and rough seas, an attempt to tow and recover the container failed. The French and Belgian authorities worked together to track the course of the containers. The container moved in a north-eastern direction through the channel. On January 4, the container disappeared under the water and was lost sight of in the Straits of Dover, just past Calais. Thereafter, nothing was seen of the container.

It was not known whether the container had sunk and had come to rest at the bottom of the sea, or had started to drift under water. Assuming the container had not sunk completely, this container was expected, based on the water current pattern, to move in a north-eastern direction along the Belgian coast. As no bags were washed ashore along the Belgian coast, it was being assumed that, for the time being, the container had remained intact. However, the authorities along the Belgian coast remained on the alert for any bags of pesticide which would wash ashore. Air surveillance was carried out daily by the Belgian authorities in order to re-establish the position of the container. The container, however, failed to be found.

The French and Belgian authorities decided against the deployment of vessels equipped with sonar equipment for tracing the drifting or sunken container. This decision was based on the fact that it was estimated that a search operation using sonar would take at least two months to cover the area since there was no indication of the location of where the container might be.

The Netherlands was informed of the properties of APRON by the Belgian authorities via a Situation Report (SITREP) on December 24. The Netherlands was subsequently kept informed of the search and cleaning activities in Belgium and France via SITREPS issued several times a week by the relevant authorities. With this information, the Netherlands was aware early on of the possible threat to the Dutch coast posed by the bags of APRON from the container which, after passing the Straits of Dover, had either sunk or was drifting north-east along the Belgian coast. The first SITREP from the Belgian authorities to the Netherlands also stated that according to the computer models, if the container had opened and the cargo had been discharged into the marine environment, the first bags of APRON could be expected to wash up on the Belgian coast between December 24 and 26.

As a precaution, the North Sea Directorate of the Department of Public Works informed the Zeeland Directorate of the Department of Public Works and the Coast Guard Centre (KWC) on December 24 that there was a chance that the bags could wash up on the coast of Zealand Flanders and Walcheren.

However, during the period around December 26, no bags of APRON washed up on the Belgian or Zealand (Dutch) coast. No bags washed ashore later on the Belgian beaches. It was therefore concluded that the drifting or sunken container was probably still intact.

Based on the assumption that the container had not sunk after passing through the Straits of Dover, model calculations carried out for the movement of the container showed that it may have been able to reach the southern boundary of the Dutch Continental Shelf around January 6. The Netherlands consequently decided to join the search operations in progress from the air. Together with the Belgian authorities, air surveillance was carried out over the area in question in order to locate the position of the lost container or of any floating bags. Also, the crew on the ferries which regularly sailed in the search area was requested to report any sightings of the floating container or bags to the KWC. As air surveillance carried out between January 4 and 7 failed to establish the position of the container and as no bags were washed up on the Belgian or Dutch coast, it was presumed that it had sunk after passing through the Straits of Dover, in Belgian waters.

At the request of the Dutch Department of Public Works, information about the properties of the compound was provided by the manufacturer, Ciba Geigy in Basle.

APRON is a pinkish red powder composed of 3 active substances: 34% furathiocarb (a carbamate), 10% metalaxyl and 6% carboxin (both anilides); the rest of the powder consists of a non-active filler. Furathiocarb is the most important substance in making a risk assessment.

APRON is easily visible when washed ashore if the packaging has been damaged. Furathiocarb, the most harmful component in APRON, is poorly soluble and bonds well to sand. Because APRON has a consistency of a fine powder, it spreads rapidly in the marine environment in the form of a suspension. Furathiocarb is rapidly converted to the metabolite carbofuran in sea water and under aerobic conditions. Under these conditions, the half-life of furathiocarb is around 1 day.

Compared with the initial substance, furathiocarb, carbofuran is easily soluble in water and bonds poorly to sand. Carbofuran, however, is less degradable; the half-life of carbofuran is around 1 month. The half-life of carbofuran increases at low temperatures (half-life at 10 degrees centigrade is several months). Carbofuran is also much more toxic than furathiocarb. Dissolved, carbofuran will quickly spread and become diluted in the marine environment, through which the harmful effects will rapidly decrease. APRON, which is wholly covered in sand and in anaerobic conditions, is poorly degradable.

The dangers of APRON mainly lie in its acute toxicity to man and the environment (varying from irritation to death); chronic effects (bioaccumulation, carcinogenicity, etc.) are not likely. In view of the physical properties of APRON (floating powder, non-volatile, poorly soluble in the first instance), the major danger is posed through intake of the powder by mouth (or beak in the case of birds) and through intake of the metabolite carbofuran dissolved in the water. Intake via skin contact and eyes is slow, but produces irritation. Intake via inhalation is exceedingly unlikely.

The Department of Public Works reported the possibility of bags washing ashore to the National Co-ordination Centre (LCC) of the Department of the Interior, in order to prepare the alert to various bodies and to the relevant local authorities. As there were no indications that any bags would actually wash ashore and no sign of the container, it was decided not to give the alert at the time.

During the first three weeks of January, the area above the southern part of the Dutch Continental Shelf was patrolled regularly during routine flights by Coast Guard aircraft. These flights yielded no sign of the container, nor any sighting of floating bags on the water surface.

On Wednesday, January 19 at 12.50 hours, the Municipal Police in Velsen reported to the Coast Guard Centre (KWC) in Ijmuiden that several hundred bags "with unknown contents" had washed up on the beach near Ijmuiden. The National Co-ordination Centre (LCC) of the Department of the Interior, the Regional Alarm Centre (RAC) in Haarlem and the radio room at Driebergen were immediately informed by the KWC of the fact that these bags had washed ashore.

From the first report stating that plastic bags had washed up on the beach, nothing about the contents of the bags could be established with certainty. The outer paper wrapping containing the label with an indication of the contents of the bags had, for the most part, disappeared due to prolonged exposure to seawater. The size of the bags, however, agreed with the specifications given by the manufacturer, Ciba Geigy. Inspection of the beach at Bloemendaal yielded a number of bags of the same type on which the product name "APRON plus 50 DS" could be made out. As it could not be ruled out that the complete contents of the container (approximately 180,000 bags of APRON) had been opened and lost at sea, the possibility of large numbers of bags of APRON washing up on the Dutch beaches had to be taken into account.

The Department of Public Works concluded that the washing ashore of a large numbers of bags of APRON posed a grave and imminent danger to man and the environment. It was therefore decided to activate the contingency plan for combating coastal pollution on the basis of a ministerial order, and to commence the cleanup operation of the beaches co-ordinated by the North Sea Directorate of the Department of Public Works.

In view of the nature of the contents of the bags and the fact that a number of the bags were found opened on the beach, safety measures were deemed necessary in cleaning operation. After consultation with the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of Agriculture, Conservation and Fisheries and with the manufacturer, Ciba Geigy, a guideline was drawn up on the procedure to be followed during the removal of the bags from the beach which was sent, together with other pertinent information, to the entities involved. The hazardous aspects of APRON led to the decision to prescribe the use of gloves, boots, protective clothing, safety goggles and breathing masks where appropriate, during inspection of the beaches and cleanup activities (see Figure 1).

Via the KWC and LCC, the North Sea Directorate informed the royal commissioners of the coastal provinces of Zeeland, Zuid-Holland, Noord-Holland, Friesland and Groningen of the centrally co-ordinated cleanup operation initiated by the North Sea Directorate, of the dangers of APRON and the measures to be taken. The coastal municipalities were subsequently brought up to date by the royal commissioners. In addition, all the entities involved (police and fire departments, municipal health services) were informed via the KWC and the RAC's of the fact that the bags had washed ashore and of the preparations to remove the bags from the beach. Moreover, the regional coastal directorates of the Department of Public Works were alerted and requested to take responsibility for cleanup up the bags of APRON.

Following inspection of the beaches, it was decided to terminate the cleanup operation on February 1. After termination of the cleanup operation, some bags continued to turn up on the beaches until February 6. The number of bags found was not considered a justification for a central co-ordinated action for their removal. However, the relevant majors became responsible for clean-up with the Department of Public Works, as a central authority, advising on the transport and handling of the bags containing the pesticide.

On January 19, the Dutch authorities arrested the Sherbro in the port of Amsterdam. Shortly after the ship's arrest, a bank guarantee of 2.5 million dollars was posted by her owners through the Protection and Indemnity Club and the ship was allowed to leave Amsterdam on January 20.

A Technical and Administrative enquiry was also carried out by the French authorities:

- it appears that the primary cause of the loss of the containers on deck was the weather conditions encountered by the vessel. The immediate cause was found to be a break in the equipment securing 40' containers;
- under the effect of two violent rolls due to the bad weather encountered by the Sherbro on Wednesday, 8 December 1993, the fastenings of certain stacks of 40' containers were broken. The majority of these stacks fell over on the port side, coming to bear on the stacks of 20' containers, the fastenings of which broke in turn. As a result, there was a lateral domino effect;
- the reason why the fastening equipment of the 40' containers broke was, it seems, due to a number of factors:
* uneven weight distribution of the stacks;
* unsuitable securing plans and methods;
* equipment fatigue.